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THE LOCAL TURN; INNOVATION AND
DIFFUSION IN CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
OLATUNDE C.A. JOHNSON*
I
INTRODUCTION
Is the future of civil rights subnational? If one is looking for civil rights
innovation, much of this innovation might be happening through legislation,
regulatory frameworks, and policies adopted by state and local governments. In
recent years, states and cities have adopted legislation banning discrimination in
housing based on the source of an individual’s income, regulating the
consideration of arrest or conviction in employment decisions, and prohibiting
discrimination in employment based on an applicant’s credit history.
This deployment of subnational power is not new to civil rights. Many of the
laws and regulatory frameworks that are now core to the national civil rights
framework started at the state level. Before the landmark Civil Rights Act of
1
1964, states such as Wisconsin, New York, Massachusetts, and California
2
banned discrimination on the basis of race in employment and housing. New
York’s administrative disparate impact standard was the precursor to the
disparate impact standard that would eventually become ensconced in federal
3
employment law. And more recently, the 1980s and 1990s saw proliferations of
state antidiscrimination laws that prohibited sexual orientation discrimination,
4
even as legislative protections have stalled on the national level.
What does appear novel, however, is the number of these initiatives in
recent years alongside the possibility that these state measures might not end
inevitably with national civil rights legislation. Indeed, for reasons of both
political economy and institutional design, some of the most innovative
examples of legislation and regulation to advance equality are likely to
permanently reside at the subnational level. Many of these innovations build on
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1. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
2. See Susan Carle, A New Look at the History of Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 251, 255 (2011); David F. Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair Employment Law:
Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights, 1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1079 n.29
(2011).
3. See Carle, supra note 2, at 236.
4. See infra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
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recent movements to use local regulatory frameworks to increase wages and
5
work conditions for lower income workers, and these innovations address not
just identity exclusion based on race or ethnicity but also exclusions based on
socioeconomic status. The political economy that sustains their emergence and
implementation depends on demographics and political cultures that are largely
centered on cities and large metropolitan regions. In addition, some of the
innovations proliferating at the state and local levels such as local first-source
6
hiring, community-benefits agreements (CBAs), and inclusionary zoning
depend on regulatory powers exclusive to subnational governments.
These proliferating state and local interventions present a different
conception of civil rights than one centered on the promulgation of federal
frameworks and the deployment of federal regulatory power. The aim of the
civil rights project is typically national—the goal is to advance rights that belong
7
to all citizens. That some states and localities are first-movers or have moreexpansive legislation can be consistent with civil rights as a national project.
Consistent with classic accounts of states and cities as laboratories of legislation
and problemsolving, states and localities can provide the regulatory models for
nationally adopted civil rights legislation. States and localities can also build
support among citizens and political leaders to advance adoption of these
initiatives at the national level.
But what if these initiatives are not in the service of an inevitable federal
project of legislation and regulation? Today, one sees very little legislative
activity at the federal level related to civil rights; all the interesting and
important moves appear to be taken on by subnational governments. And amid
uncertainty about whether these initiatives will be adopted by the federal
government and diffuse “vertically,” there is some evidence that these
8
regulatory and legislative initiatives are spreading among jurisdictions.
The question, then, is whether the “local turn” in civil rights law can ever be
a satisfactory equilibrium for those interested in advancing civil rights and
equality law. This local approach raises questions concerning the mechanisms
by which these innovations will spread from one locality to another, and
5. See Inventory of U.S. City and County Minimum Wage Ordinances, U.S. BERKELEY LABOR
CENTER,
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/minimum-wage-living-wage-resources/inventory-of-us-cityand-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (“Before 2012, only five localities
had minimum wage laws; currently 33 counties and cities do.”).
6. See infra notes 50–66 and accompanying text.
7. In the area of race discrimination and inequality, some scholars have advocated for increased
focus on localities as potential “equality innovators” to counter the limits of constitutional
jurisprudence in addressing structural racial inequity. See, e.g., Robin A. Lenhardt, Localities As
Equality Innovators, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 265, 281–85 (2011) (advocating the adoption of local
generated race-audits to understand historical and contemporary contributors to racial disadvantage
and to develop solutions). Beyond civil rights, commentators have also encouraged “progressive
federalism,” which would require the federal government to set rights and standards, but would allow
state experimentation to address inequality. See Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, The Promise of
Progressive Federalism, in REMAKING AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AN AGE OF
INEQUALITY 205–06 (Joe Soss et al. eds., 2007).
8. See discussion infra Part II.
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whether localities will have the legal, regulatory, and financial power to advance
a meaningful civil rights regime.
This article explores these questions and offers a cautiously hopeful account
of these subnational innovations. As a practical matter, when large cities and
metropolitan areas adopt these innovations, they are likely to have expansive
demographic reach. Functionally, measures such as CBAs or inclusive zoning
build on regulatory or legislative tools unavailable at the federal level. They
thus expand the domains and points of intervention for advancing inclusion—
diffusing civil rights norms to state and local actors. As a matter of political
economy, these innovations, particularly those that address questions of
economic inclusion like bans on source-of-income (SOI) discrimination and
limitations on credit history depend on local movements and local politics.
These local movements are hard to sustain at a national level and can play a
crucial role in the politics of implementation. Finally, these subnational
innovations are remaking the very nature of what we call “the civil rights
project.” Whether or not these innovations are fully successful yet, they demand
a serious look if one is concerned with expanding regulatory models of
inclusion. These new state and local measures provide routes around the
limitations of the federal civil rights model in addressing subtle bias and
structural exclusion.
Part II of this article canvasses recent legislative and regulatory initiatives at
the subnational level. This part provides an account of subnational innovation
that follows what I call the “classic antidiscrimination framework” of federal
law, but it expands the categories of prohibited discrimination. This part then
examines those innovations that move beyond the classic framework by using
novel forms of state and local regulatory power to advance inclusion. The
examples of CBAs and inclusionary zoning show that much of this local
innovation is attempting to fill in the gaps of what federal civil rights law
currently covers by explicitly addressing barriers that go to economic and classbased exclusions.
Part III examines the political economy that is likely driving these
innovations. It finds that these innovations are more than pragmatic attempts to
advance reforms that have no hope of adoption at the national level—they also
build on distinct capacities of states and localities. These capacities include the
demographic and market power of large metropolitan regions, political support
for adoption and implementation by local communities, and specific local
government powers including procurement and zoning.
Part IV addresses the legal, political, and implementation challenges that
these innovations nevertheless present and offers thoughts on how to
strengthen and diffuse the regime. These threats include preexisting and newly
enacted laws preempting state and local power by higher levels of government.
This part finally develops an account of diffusion of civil rights innovation
through regional economic competition, policy imitation, and the work of civil
society and advocacy groups. It suggests how civil rights lawyering might help
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advance this local turn, and how federal regulation can support diffusion of
inclusive innovation.
II
SUBNATIONAL INNOVATION
Determining what goes into the box of civil rights is at the heart of the claim
of subnational innovation. Classically, our civil rights regulatory regime refers
to those doctrines, laws, and regulations that prohibit discrimination based on
particular forms of identity, such as race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual
orientation. This part begins by offering examples of civil rights legislation at
the state and local levels that build on this traditional civil rights framework.
This part then considers another category of state and local innovation that is
challenging our very notion of civil rights legislation as confined to prohibitory
antidiscrimination legislation. Included in the box of “civil rights” legislation are
those measures aligned with civil rights goals but that leverage state and local
regulatory power to require regulated institutions to include historically
excluded groups.
A. Expanding Antidiscrimination
Examined first are those state and local measures that adopt the classic
prohibitory antidiscrimination framework but that expand on categories absent
in current federal law. This classic framework, typified by the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, prohibits “discrimination” based on particular identity characteristics and
provides a set of remedies enforced by courts or administrative agencies to
9
promote enforcement and compliance. The classic civil rights framework may
also include attendant mechanisms for promoting compliance through
education and technical assistance, but the framework operates primarily
through litigation by private actors or administrative agencies or through
administrative adjudication. Even before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, states
and localities adopted civil rights statutes that took this form. Indeed, significant
portions of the Title VII fair employment provisions are modeled on earlier
10
state legislation from New York.
In recent years, subnational antidiscrimination efforts taking this form
innovate not by deviating from this prohibitory or enforcement framework but
by adding new categories to the existing framework. Indeed, many of these
statutes simply add new categories to existing civil rights laws that prohibit
discrimination based on race and gender.
9. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). Title VII makes it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” Id.
10. See Carle, supra note 2, at 287 (detailing how federal law drew from the New York
experience).
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1. Examples
The most prevalent are state and local laws prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Although there exists no
explicit federal legislative ban on discrimination in employment or other sectors
based on sexual orientation, nineteen states, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico currently prohibit discrimination in employment or public
11
accommodations based on sexual orientation, and an additional 185 cities and
counties prohibit various forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation or
12
gender identity.
Wisconsin was the first state to ban discrimination based on sexual
orientation in both public- and private-sector employment discrimination when
13
it enacted legislation in 1982. The 1990s saw the expansion of these protections
by states and localities. Today, some form of protection against employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation exists in high-population states such
as California, Illinois, and New York, as well many large localities—Dallas,
Houston, Miami-Dade, and Broward County—located in states lacking
legislative protection.
In the last ten years subnational governments have expanded
antidiscrimination protection to reach other categories unprotected by federal
law. Specifically, states and localities have enacted legislation: banning
discrimination based on the source of an applicant’s income in housing,
prohibiting discrimination based on employment status, and limiting employers
from taking into account an applicant’s credit history or arrest and conviction
record before making employment decisions. The most prevalent legislation
comes in the form of state and local measures prohibiting differential treatment
on the basis of an individual’s prior arrest or conviction—known as “ban the
box” or “fair-chance” legislation. In 1998, Hawaii became the first state to “ban
the box,” forbidding employers from inquiring into an applicant’s criminal
14
history until after the employer has made a conditional offer of employment.
Minnesota enacted a similar prohibition in 2009 covering initially only public15
sector hiring (the state has since expanded it to encompass private-sector
11. As of January 2016, these states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See Non-Discrimination Laws:
State by State Information-Map, ACLU, https://www.acluorg/map/non-discriminationn-laws-state-stateinformation-map (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
12. See Local Employment Non-Discrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_ordinances/policies (last visited
Jan. 28, 2016).
13. Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), WIS. STAT. §§ 111.31–111.39 (2010). See generally
William B. Turner, The Gay Rights State: Wisconsin’s Pioneering Legislation to Prohibit Discrimination
based on Sexual Orientation, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 91, 93 (2007) (noting that Wisconsin was the first
state to adopt legislation banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
14. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5 (2015). The employer may then withdraw the conditional offer
if the employer finds the applicant’s conviction (if the conviction occurred within the prior ten years)
bears a “rational relationship” to the duties and responsibilities of the job. Id.
15. See MINN. STAT. § 364.021 (2009).
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employers), and since that time, twenty states and Washington, D.C. have
17
adopted ban-the-box policies. Some form of ban-the-box legislation has spread
rapidly in recent years among city and county governments. Boston was the first
18
city to adopt such a policy in 2004. In the following five years, twenty-one cities
19
and counties enacted similar legislation. Nationwide, more than 100 cities and
20
counties have adopted ban-the-box policies.
An increasing number of states and localities have also enacted prohibitions
that prevent various forms of employment discrimination against the
21
unemployed and those with poor credit, often due to periods of
22
unemployment and medical debt. Currently federal law only prohibits
employers from checking an applicant’s credit without written consent, and it
23
allows employees various avenues to contest the accuracy of these reports. Ten
states go further, forbidding inquiries into an applicant’s credit history unless
24
such inquiries are job related. At least one city has enacted similar
prohibitions: in 2015 New York City amended its human rights code to make it
16. See S.F. 523, 88th Leg., 2d Engrossment (Minn. 2014) (amending MINN. STAT. § 364.021).
17. See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & NAYANTARA MEHTA, NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, BAN THE BOX – FAIR CHANCE GUIDE 1, 9 (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Banthe-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf.
18. See id. at 16.
19. See id. at 16–28.
20. See id. at 1.
21. Definitions of poor credit history vary, but include those with poor credit scores, or who have
carried long-term credit card debt.
22. See AMY TRAUB, DEMOS, DISCREDITED: HOW EMPLOYMENT CREDIT CHECKS KEEP
QUALIFIED WORKERS OUT OF A JOB (2013) (survey of low and middle-income households with credit
card debt finding that poor or declining credit is associated with job loss, lack of health coverage or
medical debt); see also Robert Avery et al., An Overview of Consumer Data & Credit Report, FED. RES.
BULL. (2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0203lead.pdf; Robert Avery et al.,
Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, FED. RES. BULL. (2004), http://www.federalreserve
.gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/summer04_credit.pdf; MICHELLE M. DOTY ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND, SEEING RED: THE GROWING BURDEN OF MEDICAL BILLS AND DEBT FACED BY U.S.
FAMILIES (2008), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2008/aug/
seeing-red--the-growing-burden-of-medical-bills-and-debt-faced-by-u-s--families/doty_seeingred_1164
_ib-pdf.pdf; MATT FELLOWES, BROOKINGS INST., CREDIT SCORES, REPORTS AND GETTING AHEAD
IN AMERICA (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/5/childrenfamiliesfellowes/20060501_creditscores.pdf.
23. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(3)(B) (2012). Under the law, if an
employer makes an employment decision based on financial information in a background report, it
must supply the applicant with specific information about the credit report and give the applicant the
right to dispute the accuracy of the information. See id.
24. The states are: Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.020 (2007); Hawaii, HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 378-2.7, 378-2(8) (2009); Illinois, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/10 (2010); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.320 (2010); California, CAL. LABOR CODE § 1024.5 (West 2011); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-51tt (2011); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711 (2011); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 § 495i (2012); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-126 (2013); and Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 613.570 (2013). As of September 2014, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had
pending bills to prohibit discrimination on the basis of credit history. See Use of Credit Information in
Employment 2013 Legislation, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
financial-services-and-commerce/use-of-credit-info-in-employ-2013-legis.aspx (last visited Nov. 27,
2015).
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illegal for employers to ask about or use consumer credit information in making
25
hiring and other employment decisions.
A handful of jurisdictions—New York City; Madison, Wisconsin; and the
26
District of Columbia —ban employers from discriminating against the
unemployed, whom some studies show face distinct barriers in obtaining
27
employment. Oregon and Chicago limit employers from advertising jobs as
28
off-limits to the long-term unemployed. These various protections against the
29
long-term unemployed are less prevalent than the credit check bans. This may
be because some of the more blatant practices (such as discriminatory
advertising) have disappeared, that even sympathetic legislatures or advocates
lack confidence in an enforcement apparatus that could effectively police such
discrimination, or that legislators are accepting employer arguments that gaps in
30
employment are often a relevant factor in making employment decisions.
Housing is another area in which subnational governments have expanded
the categories of prohibited discrimination. As noted above, some states and
localities prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity,
31
categories not currently covered by federal fair housing law. A more recent
subnational expansion has been housing protections based not on identity, but
on source of income. As of March 2015, twelve states and the District of
Columbia have enacted SOI legislation that prohibits discrimination based on
an applicant’s status as a housing-voucher holder or recipient of disability
32
income, or other social-welfare system income. In addition, thirty-eight cities
25. Stop Credit Discrimination in Employment Act, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102(29), 8-107(24)
(2015). The legislation exempts certain categories of employers including police officers and other law
enforcement personnel, national security professions, those with access to trade secrets, and employees
with signatory authority to assets above $10,000.
26. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(21) (2016); MADISON, WIS., GEN. ORDINANCE § 39.03
(2016); Unemployment Anti-Discrimination Act of 2012, D.C. Code Ann. § 32-1362 (West 2016).
27. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
RATE SINCE 2007: CAUSES & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 27 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/labor_force_participation_report.pdf; Geoffrey C. Ho, et al., The Stigma of
Unemployment: When Joblessness Leads to Being Jobless (Ins. for Research on Labor and Emp’t,
Working Paper No. 2011-08, 2011), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/7nh039h1.
28. See Fair Employment Opportunity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.550 (2012); CHI. MUNICIPAL
CODE Ch. 2-160-055 (2012).
29. See generally Jeffrey Stinson, Hiring Bias Against the Unemployed: Should There Be a Law?,
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2014/08/25/hiring-bias-against-the-unemployed-should-there-be-a-law.
30. See Stinson, supra note 29 (noting that policy advocates think it may be too hard to figure out
if employers are discriminating, and that as of that time the D.C. Office of Human Rights had “received
no complaints of jobless discrimination” since the law passed in 2012).
31. The federal government does prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by
recipients of federal housing funds.
32. The states are California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH
ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL
HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 1–2 (2016), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf (compiling a list
of states that have enacted SOI legislation). Massachusetts became the first state to enact SOI
legislation in 1971. See id. at 4–19. By 1980, two more states—Maine and Wisconsin—and Washington,

6-JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE)

122

6/29/2016 3:33 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:115

33

and nine counties have adopted forms of SOI legislation. Although the earliest
efforts (in Massachusetts and Urbana, Illinois) started in the 1970s, the growing
trend toward adoption of SOI legislation is recent: since 2000 at least twenty
34
cities and four counties have enacted such legislation.
2. Situating Trends
These interventions are expanding in areas where federal legislative
protection has been unavailing. State and local measures continue to proliferate
in the absence of federal legislation protecting individuals from discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. SOI discrimination addresses a
disjuncture in federal fair housing law: the central federal rental housing
subsidy program for tenants, known colloquially as “Section 8,” is purely
35
voluntary and does not require landlords to accept it.
These initiatives also are made necessary by the challenges of addressing
these forms of discrimination through existing federal identity categories. For
instance, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and courts
have interpreted Title VII to prohibit reliance on arrest or conviction records or
on an applicant’s credit history when such reliance causes a disparate impact
(based on a category currently prohibited by federal law, such as race, ethnicity,
36
or gender) and is not job related. Gathering evidence and proving disparate
impact is typically daunting. Indeed, the EEOC has had mixed results in
pursuing disparate impact litigation based on credit history. As an example, in
2014, the Sixth Circuit rejected an EEOC suit alleging that a company’s use of
credit checks had a disparate impact on African-American applicants, disputing
the methodology that the EEOC had developed for showing a statistically
37
significant disparity. Rather than relying on a practice’s disparate impact on an
existing category (like racially disparate impact) these state and local measures
D.C. had enacted such laws. Id. at 8–9, 19.
33. The City of Urbana in Illinois was the first city to enact source of income legislation. See id. at
21–41. An additional eight cities enacted such protections in the 1970s and 1980s. Id.
34. See id.
35. The federal Section 8 program provides rental assistance vouchers for low-income households.
See Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982 (2012)
(implementing regulations). Under the program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
provides funds to local public housing authorities to distribute to qualifying tenants. Qualifying
households receive vouchers for housing that allows them to pay 30 percent of their income for housing
while the program pays the rest. The program is the largest federal program providing housing
assistance.
36. See Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, EEOC (Apr. 25, 2012), www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest
_conviction.cfm (issuing guidance on how employers might avoid disparate impact discrimination in the
consideration of arrest and conviction records in employment decisions). Several courts have found
that employment bans based on arrest and conviction may in some instances violate Title VII. See, e.g.,
El v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 248 (3rd Cir. 2007) (Employers must justify criminal
record exclusions by showing that the ban “accurately distinguish[es] between applicants that do and do
not present an unacceptable level of risk”); but see id. (affirming summary judgment for employer as
plaintiff had failed to provide necessary expert evidence on risk of recidivism).
37. See EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014).
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take aim at the practice itself. This design might reflect a legislative or advocacy
perception of the limitations of disparate impact theory, even where disparate
38
racial and ethnic impact remains a motivating concern. Or it may reflect a view
that exclusion occurring from practices like credit checks is not limited to
particular racial or ethnic groups.
In some of these areas, federal legislation could ultimately provide
nationwide protections. For instance, the proposed federal Equality Act would
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in
employment, housing, public accommodations, jury service, and federal
39
funding, among other areas. Earlier versions of this effort, which would have
prohibited discrimination only in employment, have been introduced in
Congress almost every session since 1994 and nearly passed in the Senate in
40
1996. In 2012, proponents broadened the bill and reintroduced it as the
Equality Act. Although it is not inconceivable that Congress would adopt the
bill, its latest introduction attracted more than 200 Democrat sponsors but no
41
Republican sponsors. Federal regulatory intervention may be more promising
in the short term. The EEOC has recently held in a number of rulings that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity constitutes
42
“sex” discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The immediate political landscape at the federal level for other categories,
such as SOI discrimination and discrimination on the basis of arrest or
conviction status in employment, is less promising. Although the EEOC has
issued guidance indicating that in some instances making unjustified
employment decisions on the basis of an individual’s arrest and conviction

38. See Jillian Jorgenson & Ross Barkan, City Council Passes Bill Banning Credit Checks in
Hiring, OBSERVER (Apr. 16, 2015), observer.com/2015/04/city-council-passes-bill-banning-creditchecks-in-hiring/ (quoting city council member that credit checks are a “discriminatory practice” and
have a disparate impact on particular racial and ethnic groups). Another council members supporting
such legislation stated that “rather than accept this discrimination which occurs primarily in
communities of color, we should work to ensure that all . . . have an equal opportunity in the hiring
process.” Why are Employers Checking Job Applicants’ Credit Histories?, THE NATION (Sept. 12,
2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-are-employers-checking-job-applicants-credit-histories/.
39. See The Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015).
40. See Jerome Hunt, A History of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, CTR. FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 19, 2011)¸ https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2011/07/19/
10006/a-history-of-the-employment-non-discrimination-act/. ENDA failed the Senate by one vote in
1996. In subsequent years, ENDA never emerged from committee. Id.
41. See Equality Act, S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). According to the
Washington Times, the bill stands “no chance of passage” in the current Republican-controlled
Congress. Juan A. Lozano & David Crary, Showdown in Houston over LGBT Nondiscrimination
Ordinance, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015 /oct/25/show
down-in-houston-over-lgbt-nondiscrimination-or/?page=all.
42. See Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC July 15, 2015) (holding that complaint alleging
discrimination based on sexual orientation lies within the Commission’s jurisdiction over Title VII
claims raising sex discrimination); Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012) (holding that
discrimination because an individual is transgender violates Title VII); Castello, 2011 WL 6960810
(EEOC Dec. 20, 2011) (holding that allegations that “sex-stereotyping” harmed the employment
prospects of gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals were cognizable under Title VII).
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record can constitute unlawful disparate impact, no serious legislative attempt
has been offered to expand federal antidiscrimination to directly include these
areas. There have been some proposed bills to address discrimination against
the long-term unemployed and to regulate or prohibit credit checks in
44
employment. However, legislative responses have expanded primarily at the
45
state and local levels with no serious federal counterpart on the horizon.
These initiatives also respond to contemporary barriers stemming from the
economic downturn and related trends—barriers fueled by mechanisms that are
not simply reduced to “discrimination.” These problems include the crises of
affordability in housing in cities and metropolitan areas and the blows of
economic crises that increased long-term unemployment and left individuals
with poor credit histories. The reforms also respond to problems stemming
from mass incarceration, including the need for meaningful avenues for reentry
of ex-prisoners into society and to mitigate the collateral consequences of
46
policing and arrest practices. In effect, these initiatives respond at the
subnational level to social and economic problems that are recent and urgent.
The proliferation of these civil rights statutes does not mean expanding the
antidiscrimination framework is necessarily efficacious. These expansions
deploy the antidiscrimination enforcement apparatus, with all of its limitations.
They depend on the same strained mechanisms of court and administrative
enforcement that plague other civil rights statutes. To the extent that they
require proof of intentional discrimination or disparate treatment, they raise the
questions of proof that are also present in current federal antidiscrimination
47
law. They risk confronting some of the same problems of court resistance to
43. Enforcement Guidance, Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment
Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, EEOC (Apr. 25, 2012), www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm (issuing guidance on how employers might avoid disparate impact
discrimination in the consideration of arrest and conviction records in employment decisions).
44. Several bills have been introduced at the federal level since 2011 to prevent discrimination
against the long-term unemployed. See, e.g., Jobs! Jobs! Jobs! Act of 2015, H. R. 3555, 114th Cong. §
371 (2015); Pathways Out of Poverty Act of 2015, H.R. 2721, 114th Cong. § 1471 (2015); Pathways Out
of Poverty Act of 2014, H.R. 5352, 113th Cong. § 1571 (2014); Fair Employment Opportunity Act of
2014, S. 1972, 113th Cong. (2014); American Jobs Act of 2013, H.R. 2821, 113th Cong. § 371 (2013);
Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 2011, S. 1471, 112th Cong. (2011); Fair Employment Opportunity
Act of 2011, H.R. 2501, 112th Cong. (2011). Since 2009, members of Congress have introduced
legislation to ban employers from checking the credit reports except in limited circumstances. See, e.g.,
Equal Employment for All Act of 2015, H.R. 3524, 114th Cong. (2015); Equal Employment for All Act
of 2015, S. 1981, 114th Cong. (2015); Equal Employment for All Act of 2013, S. 1837, 113th Cong.
(2013); Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 3149, 111th Cong. (2009).
45. On the federal litigation front, the EEOC has attempted to bring disparate impact cases based
on credit history to mixed success. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013)
(granting summary judgment to employer in case involving claims of discriminatory impact of criminal
and credit history background checks on minority applicants, holding that expert testimony was
unreliable and that disparate impact was not caused by a specific employment practice).
46. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–26 (2015) (arguing that arrests
themselves, regardless of whether they result in convictions, can lead to adverse consequences such as
deportation and eviction).
47. For discussions of the difficulties of bringing employment discrimination case, see Deborah M.
Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 121–25 (2012)
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these claims, particularly if they strain the resources of courts. These measures
typically require private individuals to step forward and bring claims, rather
than rely on litigation initiated by administrative agencies. Front-end
discrimination, such as hiring and refusal to rent or sell, is often hard for victims
to detect, and victims often lack incentives to pursue claims. These statutes do
not increase administrative capacity to adjudicate claims (which might be less
onerous for private plaintiffs) or for administrative agencies to initiate their
own enforcement actions.
More normatively, one could argue that taking an additive approach to
antidiscrimination by expanding the protected categories cheapens the
antidiscrimination enterprise. Discrimination based on an enduring identity
category such as race or gender may seem more worthy of government
intervention than prohibiting discrimination based on a fleeting status such as
receipt of a bad credit report. Of course, the existence and expansion of these
categories speaks to a counternarrative of justification that the effects of
economic crisis are collective problems that demand a collective response.
One could also see the proliferation of state and local category-based
prohibitory discrimination as insufficiently transformative. A better strategy
might be to move away from all categories and to instead reframe
antidiscrimination law as an across-the-board protection for all workers. For
instance, some scholars have argued that instead of forbidding termination on
the basis of a limited set of characteristics such as race and gender, governments
should prohibit termination of any worker without a good reason—ensuring
48
that “all employment decisions are made for ‘good cause.’” One could go even
further by abandoning the prohibitory antidiscrimination regime and devoting
attention to expanding social-welfare supports in order to encourage forms of
inclusion. For instance, instead of investing in forms of employment
discrimination, governments could expand social-insurance protections for the
49
unemployed. The efficacy and the value of the antidiscrimination approach
relative to other forms of regulatory intervention might be uncertain; these are
matters of consistent debate. Whatever the constraints, the preceding account

(discussing how the sharp division between disparate impact and disparate treatment prevents plaintiffs
from addressing “structural” workplace practices that fit neither the fault based disparate treatment
model or the strict liability based disparate impact model); see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (urging more explicit judicial recognition of
“negligent discrimination”—a midpoint between theories of intentional discrimination and disparate
impact type liability); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation,
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (2009) (referring to
the disparate treatment–disparate impact framework of Title VII as a “theoretical straitjacket with two
arms”).
48. RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 226 (2011) (discussing but ultimately rejecting this proposal because of the potential
costs to regulators and employers).
49. Id. at 226 (stating that the better course is to “devote scarce resources to unemployment
insurance and a robust social safety net to help cushion the blow of unavoidable employment
dislocations”).
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reveals the continuing interest at the state and local level in expanding the
antidiscrimination regime to additional categories.
B. Regulating Inclusion
The second type of intervention that is expanding at the state and local
levels deploys a regulatory form that differs from the classic antidiscrimination
framework by leveraging state and local regulatory power to advance inclusion.
Some of these regulatory efforts are identity specific—explicitly addressing race
and gender. Others are place-specific efforts to help local communities benefit
from economic development—efforts that, given contemporary levels of racial
and ethnic segregation, often benefit low-income minorities. Examples include
targeted hiring mechanisms such as first-source hiring and CBAs, as well as
inclusionary zoning, which is experiencing increased attention by jurisdictions
seeking ways to develop affordable housing and diminish racial and economic
segregation. As noted below, because all of these efforts do more than prohibit
discrimination, they push the boundaries of what we typically consider civil
rights. The regulatory innovations are aligned, however, with the civil rights
goals of integrating and providing opportunity to marginalized groups. They are
not simply broad-based social welfare interventions but are mechanisms
targeted at historically excluded groups.
Two sets of examples are offered—the first in employment, the second in
housing. In employment, the key interventions are targeted hiring
requirements, most commonly through first-source hiring and CBAs. Firstsource hiring is the requirement that local procurement contracts or other
agreements hire workers from specific local communities for publicly funded
50
projects. The aim is employing local residents who typically have been
excluded from employment opportunities because of a confluence of
discrimination, lack of training, and the absence of social capital and networks.
A related strategy is the use of CBAs, which are contractual agreements
between community coalitions and an entity such as a corporation, institution,
51
or prospective land developer. Local community groups promote the use of
CBAs in order to leverage economic expansion and benefit locally affected
communities. Typically, CBAs address wages, hiring, affordable housing,
environmental standards (including green building and green space), and the
creation of publicly accessible institutions like parks and schools. Employment

50. Greg Schrock, Remains of the Progressive City? First Source Hiring in Portland and Chicago,
51 URB. AFF. REV. 649, 650 (2015).
51. See Virginia Parks & Dorian Warren, The Politics and Practice of Economic Justice:
Community Benefits Agreements as Tactic of the New Accountable Development Movement, 17 J.
COMMUNITY PRAC. 88, 89 (2009); VIRGINIA PARKS ET AL., THE MOBILITY AGENDA, COMMUNITY
BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMY 4 (2008),
http://www.mobilityagenda.org/home/file.axd?file=2008%2F12%2FCBApaperfortheinternet.pdf;
Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits
Agreements: Case Studies of Current and Developing Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 113,
113–14 (2008).
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conditions and inclusion are among the most consistent features of these
agreements. Specifically, many include targeted hiring requirements, which
require hiring and training workers from particular communities or worker
52
centers. Cities, redevelopment agencies, and counties might be parties to these
53
agreements. Since the first CBA was developed in 1997 in Los Angeles, dozens
of CBAs have been negotiated in cities throughout the United States, including
54
in New York, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, and Seattle.
Even where CBAs are contracts between community groups and private
developers, they implicate regulation because municipal governments are often
55
given the role of enforcing the terms of the agreements. In addition, in recent
years several municipal governments have required negotiation of a CBA as a
condition for rezoning a parcel of land, obtaining tax credits, or awarding a city
56
contract. In 2015, Twitter, Inc. and other technology companies signed a CBA
in exchange for tax credits when they relocated to the rapidly gentrifying
57
Tenderloin area of San Francisco.
The model of CBAs derives from state and local affirmative-action
programs in employment. Unlike affirmative-action requirements, however,
CBAs and first-source hiring do not define the benefited group in terms of race
or gender. In part, this may be to avoid court challenges, but it also reflects a
different approach, centered on benefitting lower-wage workers and residents
in highly localized communities. Additionally, more than setting hiring goals
that effectively limit hiring to already trained and easily employed workers,
CBA and first-source hiring requirements typically encourage the hiring of
hard-to-employ workers such as those with minimal formal education, the long-

52. Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING
FAMILIES, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-community-benefits-agreementsand-policies (last visited Nov. 28, 2015).
53. See, e.g., Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements in Effect, PARTNERSHIP FOR
WORKING FAMILIES, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/page/policy-tools-community-benefits-agree
ments-and-policies-effect (last visited Nov. 28, 2015) (describing a CBA in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in
which City, County, and Redevelopment Agencies are signatories).
54. See Parks & Warren, supra note 51, at 91 (finding that between 1997 and 2008 between
seventeen and fifty CBAs have been negotiated in the United States).
55. See Parks et al., supra note 51, at 5.
56. See, e.g., PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, supra note 53 (describing city and
councilmember involvement in the Oakland Army Base Agreement).
57. The agreements required support of non-profits and local schools, and purchasing from local
small businesses. See COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENT 2015–2018 MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO CITY ADMINISTRATOR AND
TWITTER, INC. (2015), sfgsa.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentID=12590; see also
Community Benefit Agreements (2013), CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
http://sfgov.org/centralmarketcac/community-benefit-agreements-2013 (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) (listing
CBAs signed in 2013 between the City of San Francisco and six technology companies); Joshua
Sabatini, Mid-Market Tech Companies Reach New Tax-Break Agreements, THE EXAMINER (Jan. 5,
2015), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/mid-market-tech-companies-reach-new-tax-breakcommunity-agreements/Content?oid=2915898 (recounting that the CBAs had their origin as part of
tax-break established in 2011 to “soften the impacts of gentrification” while contributing to
revitalization).
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58

term disabled, and those with a criminal history. CBAs and first-source hiring
also explicitly include linkages to training and other capacity-building
59
organizations. In this way, these interventions respond to some of the
limitations of the formalist assumptions underlying the affirmative action
regime by expanding the supports that enable workers to succeed. These
supports may include meaningful training, child-care, and transportation.
Although CBAs often avoid exclusive focus on race and ethnicity, the diversity
of the large cities in which CBAs are typically deployed, coupled with the local
politics undergirding their adoption, has meant that workers of color and
women are key beneficiaries.
In the area of housing, inclusionary zoning refers to efforts to develop
affordable housing in areas or neighborhoods where such housing is limited.
This may occur through state or local changes to zoning law that require the
inclusion of a certain percentage of affordable housing in each covered
jurisdiction or development. Other inclusionary housing practices provide tax
incentives or density bonuses to private, market-rate developers in order to
encourage the development of affordable housing. Inclusionary zoning is a tool
for building affordable housing by leveraging market power or subnational
power of land use, but it also has explicit goals of reducing residential
60
segregation on the basis of income, race, and ethnicity. The practice is not new,
61
but it has become increasingly widespread in particular states. For instance,
more than 100 cities and counties in California have enacted some form of
62
inclusionary zoning. New York City has for more than twenty years operated a
voluntary inclusionary zoning program under which a developer can receive a
58. See PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, supra note 53 (describing the Kingsbridge
Amory, Bronx, New York CBA requiring hiring of a particular percentage of targeted job applicants
including but not limited to the underemployed and individuals living in designated areas surrounding
the project).
59. Parks et al., supra note 51, at 7 (“CBAs often stipulate that the developer contribute funds to
support existing job training services or create new training services necessary for the development, to
which a range of workers have access.”); see KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY COMMUNITY BENEFITS
AGREEMENT, at A-9, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/sites/pwf/files/documents/Kingsbridge%20
FINAL%20Exhibit%20A%20-%20Community%20Benefits%20Program.pdf (requiring that the
proposed project “engage the best in class hiring, referral and training agencies to identify and train
qualified employees from the Bronx and New York City, with a priority to local residents”).
60. Victoria Basolo, Inclusionary Housing: The Controversy Continues, 82 TOWN PLAN. REV. i, i
(2011) (defining “inclusionary housing” as being “aimed at creating better communities by producing
affordable housing and encouraging social inclusion” and defining “inclusion” as “racial and ethnic
integration and income-mixing”).
61. Early adopters of inclusionary zoning in the 1970s include Montgomery County, Maryland and
Fairfax County, Virginia. See id. at i–ii n.2 and accompanying text. Montgomery County’s inclusionary
zoning program required developments of fifty or more housing units to include 15 percent affordable
to moderate-income housing, and provided a “density bonus” (allowing the development of more units
than would normally be allowed under the zoning code). Id. at i–ii. Massachusetts in the 1969 adopted
what became colloquially known as “anti-snob zoning,” which limited the ability of local governments
to avoid the production of affordable housing within their jurisdiction. Connecticut and Rhode Island
have similar laws. See Spencer M. Cowan, Anti-Snob Land Use Laws, Suburban Exclusion, and
Housing Opportunity, 28 J. URB. AFF. 295, 297, 308 (2006).
62. See Basolo, supra note 60, at ii.
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density bonus in exchange for building a certain number of units of affordable
63
housing. City officials in 2016 approved a mandatory inclusionary zoning
program, which would require developers to set aside a quarter of the units in
64
new buildings as affordable housing in newly rezoned districts.
Inclusionary zoning raises a specter of issues that are beyond this article,
including the relative efficacy of market incentives, such as tax incentives and
density bonuses, versus mandatory requirements and direct subsidies in creating
affordable housing. It is also unclear whether inclusionary housing based on
market incentives will provide sufficient affordable housing to buttress the loss
of affordable housing due to gentrification and other pressures. In addition, the
extent to which such initiatives are successful in diminishing racial—as opposed
to economic—segregation depends on the structure of each particular
65
program. These questions will remain, but there is evidence of increased
interest in inclusionary housing techniques because of the rising cost of housing
66
in many major cities and metropolitan areas. Similarly, CBAs and first-source
hiring agreements hold promise as large companies risk contributing to
gentrification, displacement, and inequality in cities. But the success of CBAs
will depend on the adequacy of implementation and enforcement, and on
whether the concessions given to companies outweigh the benefits for affected
communities.
The examples of housing and employment regulation previously discussed
deviate in regulatory form and approach from the prohibitory
antidiscrimination approach. First, they rely on a distinct set of subnational
powers to advance inclusion. Inclusionary zoning and CBAs rely on state and
local power over land use and zoning. Inclusionary zoning proposals also rely
on state power to grant tax-exemptions or to provide bonuses for certain forms
of development. CBAs and first-source hiring draw on state and local
government power over procurement—the ability to decide the terms in
agreements with contractors in government-funded projects.
Second, like the antidiscrimination expansions above, these initiatives in
housing and employment move beyond the traditional categories of race,
ethnicity, and gender to advance economic inclusion. As a general matter,
CBAs and first-source hiring requirements do not limit the targeted group to
63. See NYU FURMAN CENTER, CREATING AFFORDABLE HOUSING OUT OF THIN AIR: THE
ECONOMICS OF MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY ZONING IN NEW YORK CITY, 2 (2015),
http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_CreatingAffHousing_March2015.pdf.
64. See J. Goodman, New York Passes Rent Rules to Blunt Gentrification, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/nyregion/new-york-council-passes-zoning-changes-de-blasiosought.html?_r=0 (recounting passage of City’s mandatory inclusionary zoning program).
65. See, e.g., Constantine E. Kontokosta, Mixed-Income Housing and Neighborhood Integration:
Evidence from Inclusionary Zoning Programs, 36 J. URB. AFF. 716, 736–38 (2014) (investigating
whether inclusionary zoning programs encourage stable neighborhood and economic integration and
finding that their ability to do so is dependent on initial socioeconomic and housing market
characteristics).
66. See id. at 717 (noting the “recent proliferation” of inclusionary zoning programs in the United
States).
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people of color or to women. Instead, they often seek to hire either those from
a particular geographically defined area or those trained by specific
organizations. The obvious advantage of this formulation is that these
innovations do not trigger the legal limitations of affirmative action regimes,
but the change is more meaningful than simply avoiding legal suit. The goal is
often to benefit excluded communities defined less bluntly than by categories of
race or gender. These communities are often in geographic proximity to the
planned development and are experiencing conditions of joblessness or
disinvestment rooted in a confluence of negative economic factors as well as
racialized forms of disinvestment.
These initiatives also depart from the classic antidiscrimination framework
by inserting front-end requirements of inclusion into the design, rather than
relying on complaints or administrative litigation. With effective monitoring by
community and other groups, this method can provide a potentially more
effective and direct route to achieving inclusionary goals.
III
SUBNATIONAL CAPACITY FOR INCLUSION
This part shifts away from the descriptive account to consider how these
subnational innovations might alter assumptions about state and local capacity
to advance inclusion. In the realm of civil rights, the dominant conception is
that the proper place for government intervention is national. The reasons for
this are not hard to elucidate. If all citizens should have rights to not be treated
arbitrarily with respect to employment, housing, voting, and so on, regional
variation in affording those rights is unjustified. Historically and contextually
the aim of the civil rights project of the 1960s was to create a national
framework, sweeping in outlier states that were unwilling to enforce basic civil
rights protections. Even today, states and localities often cite federalism
concerns when resisting inclusionary measures, for instance and most recently,
67
regarding gay rights, health care, and immigration. And as the history of
exclusionary zoning reveals, localities can use their powers (for instance, zoning
power) in ways that perpetuate segregation and inequality. Thus for pragmatic
as well as normative reasons, it would be hard to sustain an account that state
and local governments will always provide the ideal forum for advancing
inclusion.
At the same time, the civil rights model has never been wholly national.
Federal antidiscrimination law often borrowed models from state statutes. And
although federal antidiscrimination statutes preempt conflicting state law, in

67. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REV. 567, 569, 591–95, 600–05 (2008) (detailing state and local participation in immigration
regulation, typically considered the exclusive domain of federal law); see also Jay Michaelson, Map: The
States Still Fighting Gay Marriage, THE DAILY BEAST (July 9, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast
.com/articles/2015/07/09/marriage-backlash-bring-it-on.html (cataloguing states with officials opting out
of marriage recognition for various reasons).
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key respects they incorporate state regulatory schemes into the enforcement
68
regime. Unlike in areas such as labor or immigration law, federal civil rights
law eschews preemption of state laws that are more expansive or protective of
69
civil rights. The resulting framework is one in which federal legislation
provides a baseline, but states can go further. As a matter of ideal allocation of
power, national federal civil rights law is often the end goal of civil rights
expansion efforts, but state and local governments are posited neither as
70
“rivals” nor as mere servants of a national project. Rather, state and local law
often exists because of the void (short- or long-term) created by the absence of
federal policy, ushering in innovations meant to advance state and local
conceptions of the civil rights project.
What justifies emphasis on subnational expansion, given its necessary
limitations—the regional variation or the opt-in civil rights model it necessarily
produces? One reason for subnational expansion is the practical difficulties of
securing federal legislative intervention. Building the political support for major
71
72
legislation, and overcoming Madisonian and post-Madisonian “vetogates”
that can impede passage of legislation (like the committee system and the
68. For instance, under the Fair Housing Act, states with laws considered “substantially
equivalent” to the Act can receive funding to investigate discrimination complaints. See Substantial
Equivalence Certification, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/partners/FHAP/equivalency (last visited Nov. 30,
2015).
69. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 633 (2012) (“Nothing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any State performing like functions with regard to
discriminatory employment practice on account of age . . . .”); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2012)
(entitled “Effect on State laws”); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000h-4 (2012) (entitled “Construction of
provisions not to exclude operation of State laws and not to invalidate consistent State laws”);
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any
State or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for
the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded under this chapter.”); see also Cal. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282–83 (1987) (explaining that limited preemption under federal
antidiscrimination law “reflects the importance Congress attached to state antidiscrimination laws in
achieving . . . the goal of equal employment opportunity”). The ADEA, unlike Title VII and the ADA,
requires state agencies to relinquish jurisdiction when a federal suit under the ADEA is brought. See
Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429,
442 (1998) (noting that “[i]n contrast, parallel federal and state actions are not prohibited by either
Title VII or the ADA”). For a discussion of preemption in the context of labor law regulated by the
National Labor Relations Act, see Benjamin Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Laws in Cities
and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011). Sachs shows that despite preemption, states and localities
are developing new forms of labor organizing and worker protection, and that rather than preventing
local involvement in labor regulation, preemption “rechannels and reshapes” this involvement. Id. at
1155.
70. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L. J.
1256, 1258 (2009) (describing two dominant visions of federal–state relationship in the federalism
literature: one envisions states as “rivals and challengers to the federal government,” the other as
“servants” that carry out federal programs).
71. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). Madisonian checks and balances include the
bicameral legislature and the presidential veto.
72. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION &
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 53–55 (5th ed. 2014).
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73

filibuster), is difficult in any case, and perhaps more so for civil rights
legislation. Even as legislative and popular support for federal
antidiscrimination protections on the basis of sexual orientation has grown,
Congress has not adopted protective legislation. Meanwhile, supporters have
74
produced versions of what is now the Equality Act for the past twenty years.
Beyond these enduring difficulties, Congress has been particularly unresponsive
75
to legislation in recent years due to gridlock and party polarization.
Beyond what one might consider the negative pragmatic case stemming
from such federal failure, this part suggests there exists a positive pragmatic
case: distinct subnational capacity. Indeed some of the most innovative inclusive
frameworks—those that extend beyond the antidiscrimination mode—rely on
powers that are distinctive to states and localities.
To start, the demographic reach and economic power of large cities and
counties form part of the positive case for a focus on subnational inclusionary
frameworks. Many of the counties and cities at the forefront of adopting
inclusive legislation are large generators of economic activity, are densely
populated, and are racially and ethnically diverse. Simply, adoption of
inclusionary frameworks by large metropolitan areas provides protections for
millions of individuals. One can go further, as many urban theorists have, to
posit cities and large metro areas as significant drivers of economic and
potentially social innovation. Urban theorist Richard Florida has described the
power of metro-ification of the United States, celebrating areas with relatively
high-population density in which educated and highly skilled workers are
76
clustered, thus driving innovation and economic growth. Researchers have
73. See id at 55–56. (detailing subconstitutional “vetogates” in the legislative process that make it
easier to block than enact legislation); Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 805, 815–17 (2010) (noting that rules that constrain the legislative process promote
democratic principles but also sometimes create “vetogates” that impede legislative functioning);
SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED
STATES SENATE (1997) (providing an account of the modern filibuster).
74. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
75. See Sarah Binder, The Dysfunctional Congress, 18 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 85, 86 (2015)
(reviewing literature on the causes of legislative stalemate and finding that partisanship and electoral
competition is undermining Congress’s “broader problem-solving capacity”); Michael Barber & Norlan
McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in TASK FORCE ON NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
IN POLITICS 36–41 (Jane Mansbridge et al. eds., 2013) (summarizing evidence that polarization has
reduced Congress’s capacity to legislate); id. at 41 (arguing that the most direct “effect of polarizationinduced gridlock is that public policy does not adjust to changing economic and demographic
circumstances”); Gary C. Jacobson, Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper, 43
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 688, 691–97 (2013) (providing evidence that polarization among the
electorate is a key driver of congressional polarization). For a recent review of the causes and
consequences of gridlock and polarization, see generally SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN
AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015). Indeed, one can understand federal administrative innovation
in recent years—such as interpreting Title VII prohibitions on sex discrimination to extend to
discrimination on gender identity, extensions of discrimination protections on the basis of sexual
orientation to federal contractors, and deferred deportation status of certain classes of undocumented
immigrants—as driven by the inability to enact comprehensive legislative solutions.
76. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002) (concluding that
the key to economic growth is attracting creative workers that can transform society).
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noted that young skilled workers are increasingly favoring cities in recent years.
Conditions of economic growth provide the capacity for innovation around
inclusion—where business is expanding, interventions like inclusionary zoning
and CBAs are more possible. As Richard Schragger has described, cities
depend on capital, but they also have assets such as land and location that might
77
allow them to regulate capital in redistributive ways. The CBA movement is
motivated by the recognition that cities need capital, but capital often requires
78
cities for its land and labor. Cities provide the opportunity to leverage
economic expansion to force inclusion. Some of these cities and metropolitan
areas with relative economic power also are places of economic inequality with
substantial poverty rates. With populations of need, many have economic
incentives to provide remedies.
Beyond economic incentives, inclusive policies may result from accession to
the political demands of groups representing workers, immigrants, people of
79
color, and LGBTQ groups that have power at the local level. Certain cities and
counties also provide ready clusters of those with a “taste” for equality, racial
80
and ethnic integration, and economic and identity diversity. Inclusive policies
can attract the very groups that then support the expansion and creation of
81
additional forms of inclusion. Localities also have urgent and “lived”
experience with how structural inequity impacts particular groups, providing
82
them both knowledge and urgency in crafting solutions.
The role of local political movements may be salient in the explanation of
the emergence of inclusive policies. It also may be necessary for meaningful
implementation. In different ways, CBAs, fair-chance laws, and inclusionary

77. See Richard Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City,
123 HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009). Schragger’s account and those of others challenge the limited city
account that sees cities as dependent on capital and unable to control their economic futures. See PAUL
PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 4 (1981) (discussing a limited city account); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980) (arguing that cities are insufficiently able to control their
economic development because of limiting state and federal law).
78. See generally Parks & Warren, supra note 51, at 89 (explaining that CBAs exploit the
“geographic constraints of a post-industrial, service-sector economy (hotel beds cannot be globally
outsourced to be made, sports areas demand real bodies to fill their seats, retailers increasingly seek the
purchasing power of urban consumers) and the political process that attends these geographic
constraints: service-sector enterprises that are the hallmark of new urban development need the city,
securing the special purchase that urban politics and governance provides grassroots actors for
contesting corporate power”).
79. See, e.g., Justin P. Steil & Ion B. Vasi, The New Immigration Contestation: Social Movements &
Local Immigration Policy Making in the United States, 2000-2011, 119 AM. J. SOC. 1104, 1142 (2014)
(describing conditions under which local community organizations and immigrant community leaders
mobilized and created effective frameworks to advance inclusionary policies at the local level).
80. See Rodriguez, supra note 67.
81. See Richard Florida, What is it Exactly that Makes Big Cities Vote Democratic?, CITY LAB
(Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2013/02/what-makes-some-cities-vote-democratic/4598/.
Some scholars credit the diffusion of inclusionary zoning polices to the strength of the fair housing
groups in particular communities. See infra note 104.
82. See generally Lenhardt, supra note 7, at 288 (detailing incentives that localities have to
experiment with solutions to address inequality within their borders).
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zoning depend on robust local community groups for effective enforcement and
83
implementation.
This account is not inevitable. Cities and regions will diverge sharply in their
84
economic capacity and in their inclinations and capacities for inclusive
85
regulation. Expanding cities seeking to attract economic industry may be too
beholden to economic interests to extract inclusionary concessions. Still, this
account provides a possible explanation of the adoption of inclusive measures
by subnational governments, as well as an argument for the potential strategic
and practical benefits of concentrating on subnational governments as a source
of inclusionary innovation.
Beyond economic power and demographic conditions, many of the
innovations also depend on powers that exist primarily at the subnational level.
Indeed the most innovative inclusionary regulations—those that do not deploy
the prohibitory antidiscrimination form—depend on these distinct subnational
capacities. Subnational governments have powers over procurement, land use,
and taxing that provide the mechanisms for CBAs, inclusionary zoning, density
and tax bonuses for inclusionary housing, and first-source hiring. Understanding
these innovations as stemming from distinct subnational capacity allows moving
from a pragmatic account of the value of state and local intervention to the
potential of these interventions to reframe a civil rights project that has
innovated little in terms of its regulatory tools. In the manner noted in part II,
these interventions do not depend on the ex post, prohibitory, court-centered
86
regulatory mechanisms of antidiscrimination law. Second, and relatedly, in
expanding the points of intervention, they usher in a regulatory regime that
moves away from antidiscrimination to social inclusion. This allows a focus on
economic exclusion along with traditional identity categories. It also creates an
83. See, e.g., Parks & Warren, supra note 51, at 99–100 (detailing the role of community and labor
constituencies in securing CBAs).
84. See id. at 102 (noting that CBAs work only “under conditions of economic and urban
growth”). And some cities today are shrinking instead of growing. See generally Michelle Wilde
Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014) (examining the problem of insolvent
cities).
85. Localities with racially and ethnically diverse populations do not consistently advance inclusive
policies. See Steil & Vasi, supra note 79, at 1104 (finding that localities enacting “anti-immigrant”
ordinances had often experienced an increase in the Latino population, and local anti-immigrant
groups framed these increases as connected to threats such as rising crime rates); Michael Selmi, Race
in the City: The Triumph of Diversity and the Loss of Integration, 22 J.L. & POL. 49 (2006) (arguing that
even as many cities have become composed of a mostly minority population, relatively elite whites have
retained political power and may act in ways that benefit their interests). Social science has shown that
local innovation policies are driven in part by the resources and revenues available to local government.
Richard D. Bingham, Innovation, Bureaucracy, and Public Policy: A Study of Innovation Adoption by
Local Government, 31 WESTERN POL. Q. 178, 200 (1978); Richard C. Feiock & Jonathan P. West,
Testing Competing Explanations for Policy Adoption: Municipal Solid Waste Recycling Programs, 46
POL. RES. Q. 399 (1993).
86. As I have noted in other contexts, this is the predominant, but not the only, framework at the
national level. See Olatunde Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in
American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1362–69 (2012) (describing conditioned spending regimes that
contain “equality directives”).
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embedded approach to equality—one in which institutions are targeting
87
inclusion at the front-end in the design of their projects and programs. One
might say that these interventions broaden the regulatory “architecture of
88
inclusion.” In this embedded approach, a broader range of government
decisions and policies are reframed as potential sites for advancing inclusion.
IV
CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES: PREEMPTION, VARIATION, AND DIFFUSION
Whereas part III made the case for subnational capacity, this part confronts
the challenges for those seeking to “diffuse” these innovations—expanding
state and local engagement in advancing inclusion and expanding specific laws.
A. Challenges
Part III has already alluded to a central challenge: economic capacity and
political inclinations will vary among localities. Another related challenge is
legal incapacity. Some localities may not have the legal power over land use,
procurement, or taxing that allows them to adopt these innovations. This is not
fatal to the larger project. Subnational innovation often relies on a locality using
the power it possesses, working within constraints. Lacking powers of tax,
localities might channel inclusionary policies into zoning or procurement.
Without power over licensing, a locality might use its power to certify, publicize,
or inspect. These limitations do, however, mean that subnational innovation
may sometimes depend on expansion of subnational power, with thought given
to creating the attendant mechanisms of oversight and transparency that justify
89
enlarging these powers.
Preemption by federal or state law may also be a problem. For instance, SOI
laws have faced consistent legal challenges. Challengers have asserted that to
the extent that SOI laws require landlords to accept federal voucher recipients,
the laws are preempted by federal law stating that landlords are not required to
90
take Section 8 vouchers. Preemption challenges have not proven successful in
court likely because federal Section 8 law gives states and localities a role in the

87. See id. at 1369–70 (describing this feature).
88. See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006).
89. For example, historic constraints on cities are driven by concerns about corruption in cities and
their ability to be controlled by special interest groups.
90. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105–06 (Mass. 1987) (holding that the Section
8 program “does not preclude State regulation” since “[t]he Federal statute merely creates the scheme
and sets out the guidelines for the funding and implementation of the program by the United States
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through local housing authorities.”).

6-JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE)

6/29/2016 3:33 PM

136

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 79:115

91

program’s design. No other significant initiative mentioned in this article has
faced serious federal preemption arguments.
A perhaps greater challenge to subnational capacity is the increasing issue
of what one might call “manufactured preemption”: when local inclusionary
legislation prompts state legislatures to enact policies depriving local
92
governments of existing powers. These moves—which have been employed at
the state level to preempt local minimum wage laws—may reflect legitimate
concern about which level of government is best suited to enact policies that
93
risk generating economic externalities. But many of these moves at the state
level to preempt local power seem motivated by ideological or practical
opposition to specific measures. In the area of antidiscrimination, Arkansas, in
2015 adopted legislation effectively preempting local ordinances that protect
94
LGBT people from discrimination. Legislatures in Texas and West Virginia
introduced measures in 2015 that would have similar preemptive effects if
95
enacted. North Carolina in 2016 passed legislation preempting municipalities
91. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs. Privacy World at Glenmont Metro Ctr., 936
A.2d 325, 333–40 (Md. 2007) (holding that the federal Section 8 program does not preempt the state’s
source of income statute); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104, 1113 (N.J. 1999) (same);
see also Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner Co., 549 F. Supp. 2d 78, 87–89 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding the SOI
protections in D.C. Human Rights law were not preempted by the federal Housing Choice Voucher
program).
92. One might call it “partisan preemption.” As Jessica Bulman-Pozen has shown, arguments
about allocations of power are often driven by ideological and partisan interests. See Jessica BulmanPozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2014) (“Federalism provides the
institutional terrain for disputes that are substantive in nature.”) This is not entirely new. Ideological or
partisan proponents of regulation have long appealed to a higher level of government to adopt
measures preempting actions by lower levels of government. The Supreme Court has placed
constitutional constraints on the ability of a higher level of government to take power away from an
existing decision-making body, such as local government, in such a way as to burden minority interests.
See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 386, 393 (1969) (holding that an amendment to a city charter was
unconstitutional because it prevented the city council from implementing an ordinance dealing with
race, religious, and ancestral discrimination); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461,
487 (1982) (finding a Washington state statute unconstitutional because it prevented the local school
district from reassigning students to schools outside their neighborhoods for purposes of promoting
integration). The broad contours of the “Hunter” doctrine were weakened by the Supreme Court’s
2014 decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (limiting
Seattle and Hunter to cases involving intentional discrimination).
93. See Alan Blinder, When A State Balks at a City’s Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/us/alabama-moves-to-halt-pay-law-in-birmingham.html (reporting
on an Alabama State Senate proposal that would ban the state’s cities and counties from enacting their
own minimum wages, and quoting the state representative sponsoring the legislation who questioned
whether “cities are equipped to analyze and determine what the appropriate minimum wage is, and
what those impacts are”).
94. See An Act to Amend the Law Concerning Ordinances of Cities and Counties by Creating the
Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act; To Declare An Emergency: and For Other Purposes, Ark.
Sess. Act 137 (2015), http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2015/2015R/Acts/Act137.pdf.
95. See Michael G. Bare, Preempting Civil Rights, GRASSROOTS CHANGE (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://grassrootschange.net/preempting-civil-rights/; Andy Garcia, Preemptions: The Lurking Threat to
Local LGBTQ Nondiscrimination Protections, EQUALITY FEDERATION (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.equalityfederation.org/2016/03/3673/; Elizabeth Reiner Platt, States Attempting to Preempt
LGBT-Friendly Municipalities, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (Feb. 11, 2016), http://blogs.law.colu
mbia.edu/publicrightsprivateconscience/2016/02/11/states-attempting-to-preempt-lgbt-friendly-
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from enacting local measures to allow transgendered individuals to use the
bathroom that corresponds to their gender identity as well as preempting
96
private enforcement of local antidiscrimination ordinances. The spreading
“conscience” bills that would allow religious and conscience objections to forms
of gay inclusion also have preemptive effects. For instance, Indiana’s Religious
97
Freedom Restoration Act preempts local antidiscrimination ordinances. These
appeals by opponents to a higher level of government blunt the power that
advocacy groups may have at the local level to advance inclusive policies. Local
political movements may be able to advance inclusionary legislation at the city
levels, but less politically amenable state legislatures can then curtail those
powers.
For those seeking to advance inclusionary legislation, there are no simple
solutions for these challenges. In some cases arguments about the merits of the
subnational regulatory intervention, the “ideal” allocation of authority, or the
functionally proper level of government for experimentation with inclusion may
prevail over efforts by higher levels of government to preempt. The success of
policies in one location helps to mute arguments against adoption in another
location. But it also may happen that these arguments about deploying local
power to address forms of inequality will not prevail. The project of expanding
inclusion is inevitably political, requiring the building of political support for
adoption, as well as the rebuffing of potential challenges.
B. Horizontal Diffusion
Without discounting these challenges, this section offers a framework for
encouraging greater diffusion of inclusionary initiatives. The central challenge
posed by an account of subnational inclusionary innovation is how these
innovations might spread. As a contained local intervention, they may have
limited practical effect or utility. From an advocacy perspective, one would
want promising models to be spread through adoption by the federal
government, or adoption by other states and localities.
The familiar emphasis in antidiscrimination law is one of adoption by the
federal government, a mechanism of vertical diffusion. A state or locality
adopts a fair housing or employment law, and the federal government borrows
this model in adopting its law or regulatory intervention. In this model of
diffusion, state and local stakeholders may help expand the political base of
support that then makes national policy possible.
Vertical diffusion is desirable for the reasons stated above, but both
normatively and descriptively, it cannot provide the only model for diffusion.
For one, in the current legislative climate, the road to vertical diffusion may be
municipalities/.
96. See Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, 2016 N.C. SESS. LAWS 3,
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E2/Bills/House/PDF/H2v4.pdf.
97. See An Act to Amend the Indiana Code Concerning Civil Procedure, SEN. ENROLLED ACT
NO. 101 (2015), https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2015/bills/senate/101#document-92bab197.
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98

long. Adoption of these models will depend on political constituencies and
stakeholders that might more effectively be able to coalesce at the subnational
level (for instance, those centered in cities, and in some cases metropolitan
areas). Moreover, a positive aspect of these innovations is their reliance on a set
of distinct subnational powers including zoning, taxation, and procurement. The
model of diffusion, then, for many of these particular measures will be
horizontal, meaning they will be adopted by various regions, or spread from one
region to another. Even as to more traditional antidiscrimination laws, a regime
of local, state, and federal laws is likely to be more effective in creating a
climate of compliance. A conceptual framework for horizontal diffusion thus
seems necessary.
Inclusive legislation might at least in theory be diffused horizontally through
the mechanisms of diffusion that operate in other policy regimes. These may be,
99
for instance, through a race-to-the-top: “California effect,” competition, or
policy imitation. As an illustration of the California effect, when a large state
requires a corporation to hire without regard to sexual orientation, that
corporation may adopt these antidiscrimination or inclusive practices in other
branches or subsidiaries not located in the covered state. The California effect
may be a less persuasive account for all-inclusive regulation. For instance,
mechanisms that involve local institutional actors (versus large, multistate
players) and place-based interventions (like inclusionary zoning) may be less
amenable to the “California effect.”
Another mechanism of diffusion might be competition in neighboring
100
regions. If inclusive policies generate positive policy effects such as more
affordable housing or greater levels of employment, jurisdictions might adopt
these policies so they can effectively compete for citizens or employers. There
may also be competition for citizens or employers who desire these inclusive
policies for their own sake. Anecdotally, some regions claim to have adopted
“gay friendly” legislation because they seek to remain attractive to major
corporations. Human Rights Campaign, a prominent LGBTQ advocacy group,
explicitly appeals to competition in its work to expand antidiscrimination
provisions and other inclusive municipal practices. Human Rights Campaign’s
98. See supra notes 44, 71–75 and accompanying text (discussing barriers to enactment of
legislation in these areas).
99. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1011 (1999) (defining “California effect” as the “upward ratcheting of regulatory standards through
market mechanisms”).
100. For accounts of this dynamic of diffusion, see generally Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden,
Policy Diffusion: Seven Lessons for Scholars and Practitioners, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 788, 789–90
(2012) (summarizing researchers who posit that regions adopt policies to compete for business and
affluent residents); Frances S. Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations:
An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395, 410 (1990) (studying state lottery adoptions and
finding support for the claim that diffusion was the result of both internal political and economic
characteristics of a state and the number of neighboring states that had adopted lotteries). See generally
Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 880
(1969). Some claim that competition will fuel a “race to the bottom” in the case of economically
redistributive policies.
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“Municipal Equality Index,” which rates cities on their inclusive policies,
provides both a menu of policy and regulatory initiatives for inclusion and
allows cities to compare themselves against others in their progress toward
101
inclusive legislation and practices. The group frames its case for municipal
equality not only in terms of fairness, but also in the distinct language of
regional competitiveness. Cities with vibrant gay and lesbian communities,
Human Rights Campaign argues, have better economic outcomes and business
102
climates, and they attract the most talented and skilled citizens.
Whether this argument is an actual driver of municipal adoption of
inclusiveness is not clear. And these are not arguments that will work for all
policies. Narratives of competition may be most effective after an inclusionary
policy has spread—an argument more persuasive for luring the later adopters
than jumpstarting the initial set of early adopters. And not every inclusionary
policy, particularly those affecting less economically enfranchised populations
such as SOI discrimination or CBAs, will be easily framed in terms of its ability
to enhance a city’s magnetic appeal to skilled, affluent residents and businesses.
103
A final driver of diffusion might be policy imitation by learning. Regions
may borrow inclusive policies and practices that are perceived to be effective
and fair from other regions. This borrowing may happen when political and
policy leaders look to other regions for models. Or the borrowing may happen
through the work of advocates and community stakeholders.
The empirical literature on what mechanisms fuel diffusion of the inclusive
policies discussed in this article is scant. Two researchers studied the diffusion
104
of inclusionary zoning practices in the San Francisco Bay Area. By 2007, 68
101. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN & EQUAL. FED’N INST., MUNICIPAL EQUALITY INDEX: A
NATIONWIDE EVALUATION OF MUNICIPAL LAW (2014).
102. See id. at 7 (“Cities are in constant competition for residents, business, and employees, and
inclusiveness is an important factor that attracts all three.”).
103. This is of course the hope famously expressed by Justice Brandeis’ oft-invoked state
laboratories metaphor. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”);
see also Doni Gewirtzman, Complex Experimental Federalism, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 241, 241–44 (2015)
(arguing that collective learning is more effective when states are conducting simultaneous
experiments); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399–400 (1997) (providing
an account of public problem solving through experimentation). For an empirical account of diffusion
through learning, see Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (2006). Many have also critiqued the notion that
state experiments promote innovation. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333 (2009) (arguing that
state and local governments are unlikely to innovate at the optimal social level or to be successful in
capturing the benefits of experimentation); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does
Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (arguing that incentives for states and
localities to innovate are dampened by collective action and free-rider problems).
104. See Rachel Meltzer & Jenny Schuetz, What Drives the Diffusion of Inclusionary Zoning, 29 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 578 (2010). The article examines inclusionary zoning programs that either
“require or offer incentives for developers to set aside a certain percentage of the units within their
market-rate residential developments at prices or rents affordable to specified income groups.” Id. at
578.
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percent of San Francisco Bay Area jurisdictions had adopted some form of
105
The researchers studied those programs
inclusionary zoning program.
adopted between 1980 and 2003 and found (not entirely unsurprisingly) that the
cost of local housing and the share of democratic voters significantly predicted
106
the likelihood of a jurisdiction adopting an inclusionary zoning program.
Another strong predictor of adoption was the existence of an established
107
affordable housing nonprofit organization. These conclusions are consistent
with studies in other contexts that show that strong advocacy groups within
108
states and localities and interstate nonprofit networks can help support and
109
This research has
spread policies among subnational governments.
implications for federal regulatory architecture and lawyering as discussed in
the next section.
C. Diffusers
Whatever the specific mechanisms at play, the empirical literature suggests
that diffusion would be boosted by regulatory or advocacy intervention that
takes the project of horizontal diffusion seriously. This section explores the
implications for rethinking existing legal and regulatory regimes, specifically
with regard to (1) federal regulatory architecture and (2) lawyering.
1. Regulatory Architecture
If subnational governments are key players in inclusionary innovation, this
has important implications for the design of the federal regulatory regime,
110
which can play a role in fueling inclusionary policy. The civil rights regulatory
regime relies largely on mandatory rules imposed through antidiscrimination
prohibitions and conditioned spending. Strains on the private attorney-general
regime and the limited efficacy of ex post enforcement regimes in addressing
105. See id. at 578–79.
106. See id. at 579 (“This suggests that [inclusionary zoning] adoption may reflect some
communities’ higher preferences for an active government role in economic regulation and
redistribution.”); id. at 597 (“[E]ven within a relatively liberal region of the country, we find that
jurisdictions with more Democratic constituencies are more likely to opt for IZ programs.”).
107. See id. (“[P]laces choosing to adopt [inclusionary zoning] are already sensitive to their
affordable housing needs and have a nonprofit infrastructure in place to carry out the programs.”); id.
at 595 (“[I]f affordable housing nonprofits in a jurisdiction are on average 1 year older, the probability
of [inclusionary zoning] adoption increases by 2 percent.”); id. at 598 (qualitative case study of San Jose
concluding that support for inclusionary zoning “reflects partisan affiliation by elected officials and
residents, as well as the presence of affordable housing (and other liberally leaning) nonprofit
organizations”).
108. See, e.g., Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of
Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 (2006) (finding that the presence
of strong state health lobby groups fueled moved of local antismoking policies to the state level).
109. See Steven J. Balla, Interstate Professional Associations and the Diffusion of Policy
Innovations, 29 AM. POL. RES. 221, 240 (2001) (examining adoption of a health insurance intervention
developed by an interstate professional association and finding empirical support for the notion that
“associations can affect policy diffusion”).
110. See id. at 222 (summarizing research showing that “[p]olicy makers may receive information
about, as well as incentives to adopt, innovations from the federal government”).
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structural exclusion point to the need for a greater focus on conditioned
111
spending. Spurring and supporting state and local innovation would require
further retooling of the current spending and regulatory regime to provide
spending carrots as well as traditional spending sticks, and to provide for
greater dissemination of model interventions (be they the result of traditional,
112
conditioned spending or grant-making programs).
As a matter of design, this emphasis would require an enhanced role in the
civil rights regime for federal agencies that have grant-making and spending
authority. Agencies like the Department of Labor and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development can offer grant programs to encourage
adoption of inclusionary legislation and initiatives. A key aspect of the current
civil rights regime requires those who take federal funds to comply with federal
rules and directives. With new insights on the possibility of state and local
diffusion, one can maintain important federal baselines and directives that
further civil rights and inclusion while supporting the expansion of new
inclusionary measures. Why not also provide “carrots”—rewards or
incentives—for state and local governments to experiment with model
interventions or to adopt those with proven benefits? This might be
accomplished through the creation of new grant programs, or through redesign
of existing programs. The federal regime would also incorporate mechanisms
for spreading innovations, through study and analysis of programmatic efficacy
113
and model interventions. This could occur in conventional conditioned
spending programs, as well as in grant programs.
Such an emphasis would not be new in many areas of law and policy, but it
would require a reshifting of how civil rights regulatory regimes and civil rights
agencies typically operate today. At the same time, these suggestions are not
fanciful. There are indications that this regulatory shift is already emerging.
Three federal departments—the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the Department of Transportation, and the Environmental
Protection Agency—have initiated a “partnership for sustainable
communities,” which awards funding to state and local efforts to build
affordable housing, redesign transportation infrastructure, and promote
114
environmental efficiency.
The Department of Labor has announced
111. See Johnson, supra note 86, at 1362–63 (arguing that predominant focus on public and private
enforcement ignores conditioned spending as a powerful form of regulatory intervention).
112. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 419–38 (1998) (arguing that local experiments are enhanced by information
pooling in which regional and national coordinating bodies share knowledge).
113. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 7, at 223 (arguing that the federal government can
support state laboratories of democracy by collecting data, evaluating state experiments,
benchmarking, and disseminating the results of those experiments).
114. See PSC 2015 Priorities, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE CMTYS., http://www.sustainable
communities.gov/mission/about-us (last visited Dec. 3, 2015) (describing 2015 goals as using “agency
resources to advance Ladders of Opportunity for every American and every community[;] helping
communities adapt to a changing climate, while mitigating future disaster losses[;] [and] supporting
implementation of community-based development priorities”).
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competitive grants to public–private partnerships to “develop and implement
innovative, high-quality [] apprenticeship programs” that move workers into
115
“high-growth occupations and industries.” A key focus of the grant program is
spurring partnerships that increase training opportunities for historically
excluded groups, including women, people with disabilities, and young men and
116
women of color. Another such grant program awards grants for innovative
approaches to training low-skilled and historically excluded workers for
117
employment in the technology industry. In addition to leveraging government
funds to develop new strategies for inclusion, these approaches have the
advantage of “pooling” agency resources to meet economic inclusion as well as
118
antidiscrimination goals. For instance, in the area of employment this might
include both providing skills training for workers and advancing inclusion of
particular groups. In the area of housing it might include both building
affordable housing and advancing civil rights goals of nondiscrimination and
integration.
2. Lawyering
An increased emphasis on state and local diffusion also has implications for
the work of civil rights lawyers and advocates who have traditionally been
focused on courts and federal legislative intervention. Whether inclusionary
models diffuse through competition, imitation, or strong local advocacy groups,
networks of local groups can likely help advance this process. Following the
119
insights derived from studies of local diffusion, established local groups can
help promote policies in particular regions, as well as create networks to share
implementation strategies and model legislative and regulatory design. Lawyers
and advocates with a national focus can play roles as conveners and
disseminators of information.
Groups associated with business interests have long created networks and
120
structures to advance legislation at the state and local levels. Groups

115. See Opportunities, DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/featured/cwip/opportunities (last
visited Jan. 10, 2016) (describing reward of up to $100 million in grants financed by a user fee generated
by the H-1B nonimmigrant visa program). The grants competition will “focus on public–private
partnerships between employers, business associations, joint labor-management organizations, labor
organizations, training providers, community colleges, local and state governments, the workforce
system, non-profits and faith-based organizations.” Id.
116. See id.
117. See TechHire Grant Competition, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/grants
/funding-ops.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2015) (announcing $100 million in grants “to support innovative
approaches to moving lower skilled workers on the fastest paths to well-paying information technology
and high growth jobs in industries like healthcare, advanced manufacturing, financial services, and
other in-demand sectors”).
118. See Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 211 (2015) (describing
phenomenon of joint “structures capable of ends that no single agency could otherwise achieve”).
Renan also provides some reasons to be cautious about the agency pooling approach from the
perspective of administrative law and design. See id. at 284–85.
119. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
120. One of the most prominent groups advocating for business interests is the American
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advocating for civil rights and inclusionary legislation have in recent years
entered the subnational domain as well. National-level groups support and
convene local advocates. The work may include gathering information,
identifying and drafting model legislation, or writing reports and providing
121
technical or legal assistance to local groups. Groups like the National
Employment Law Project gather information on new state and local fair
employment laws, provide model legislation, and offer assistance on legislative
122
strategy and implementation. The Partnership for Working Families provides
legal and policy support for community organizations seeking to develop and
123
implement CBAs. Another model is the one offered by the Human Rights
Campaign’s work on developing a “municipal equality index,” which provides a
template for municipalities seeking to adopt LGBTQ-friendly policies and
124
allows cities to be compared to one another.
It is important to emphasize that equality groups have traditionally not
engaged in creating the interstate networks and the state and local advocacy
structures needed to advance subnational inclusionary frameworks. Taking
horizontal diffusion seriously will require a shift in current emphasis. It will also
require belief in what cannot yet fully be known—that the subnational level
holds promise for promoting civil rights and inclusion.
V
CONCLUSION
This article has taken an optimistic assessment of states and localities as
potential sources of regulatory innovation to advance inclusion. This optimism

Legislative Exchange Council, founded in 1975. For scholarly examinations of the American Legislative
Exchange, see generally Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Who Passes Business’s “Model Bills”? Policy
Capacity and Corporate Influence in U.S. State Politics, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 582 (2014) (describing
history of the group and providing an account of its role in promoting pro-business, anti-regulatory
legislation across the states).
121. See, e.g., RODRIGUEZ & MEHTA, supra note 17 (discussing the National Employment Law
Project’s work on “Ban the Box” legislation). Groups like National Fair Housing Alliance (a
consortium of non-profit fair housing organizations and state and local agencies) and the Poverty Race
Research Action Council (PRRAC) perform similar functions regarding SOI legislation. See, e.g.,
POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR
BUILDING
A
SUCCESSFUL
HOUSING
MOBILITY
PROGRAM
(2015),
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf. The Partnership for Working Families provides technical and
legal assistance to promote CBAs. See Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies,
PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, http://www.forworking families.org/resources/policy-toolscommunity-benefits-agreements-and-policies (last visited Dec. 3, 2015).
122. See, e.g., MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & ANASTASIA CHRISTMAN, NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, FAIR CHANCE - BAN THE BOX TOOLKIT (2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/
NELP-Fair-Chance-Ban-the-Box-Toolkit.pdf; MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ, NAT’L EMP’T
LAW PROJECT, BEST PRACTICES AND MODEL POLICIES: CREATING A FAIR CHANCE POLICY (2015),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fair-Chance-Ban-the-Box-Best-Practices-Models.pdf.
123. Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies, PARTNERSHIP FOR WORKING
FAMILIES, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-community-benefits-agreementsand-policies (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
124. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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is vulnerable to the charge that it produces an uneven “opt-in” equality regime.
Yet, it is important to note that the framework depends on a national baseline
regime of civil rights and inclusion. The question now is how one moves
beyond the existing framework to address contemporary problems of
discrimination or inequality. Many of the most promising state and local
measures are noteworthy because they supplement the federal
antidiscrimination regime, and because they employ tools distinct to states and
localities that are largely unavailable in federal law.
In the end, state and local innovation might open the door to expanding the
regulatory, legal, and policy mechanisms that advance meaningful equality and
inclusion. Inclusionary regimes at all levels of government might do better to
rely on a greater range of market and regulatory incentives and mechanisms to
promote inclusion, including the use of grants, tax, and even “soft” regulatory
interventions like ratings and certification. Even if one is not yet persuaded of
the success of any particular initiative, an examination of these innovations
allows us to imagine the possibility of new regimes that might better promote
economic, identity, and social inclusion.

